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Golden Creditors, Copper Rules
AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 544(b) OF
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE IN CASES WHERE A
FEDERAL CREDITOR HOLDS A CLAIM
INTRODUCTION
Generally, when a debtor files a bankruptcy petition,
the property owned by the debtor at the time of filing becomes
property of the bankruptcy estate,1 and this estate property is
used to pay all or part of creditors’ claims. In a Chapter 7
liquidation case, for example, a bankruptcy trustee will liquidate
the estate and distribute the proceeds to creditors. In some cases,
prior to the commencement of the case, a debtor may transfer
assets to others in an effort to put those assets out of the reach of
the trustee and creditors. Transfers of property that are made
“with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors or
transfers for less than fair value constitute fraudulent transfers
and may be unwound pursuant to the trustee’s avoidance powers.2
In order to avoid such transfers, the trustee may
invoke the Bankruptcy Code’s internal fraudulent conveyance
provision, which is codified in Section 548. Alternatively, the
trustee may invoke Section 544(b), which enables the trustee
to step into the shoes of a creditor and exercise the rights of
that creditor to avoid fraudulent conveyances pursuant to
nonbankruptcy law. Section 544(b) provides that “the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable
law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim.”3 When the
bankruptcy trustee avoids a fraudulent transfer of property
pursuant to Section 548, the property or the value of the
property is returned to the estate. The same is true of transfers
avoided pursuant to Section 544(b). Although the trustee steps
into the shoes of an existing creditor, the transfer is not
avoided for the benefit of that creditor specifically; rather the
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).
2 Id. § 548.
3 Id. § 544(b).
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property (or its value) is clawed back into the estate for the
benefit of all creditors.4
Since most states have adopted uniform fraudulent
conveyance statutes that provide four-year statutes of limitation,5
a key feature of Section 544(b) is that it allows the trustee to
take advantage of these longer statutes of limitation rather
than the two-year statute of limitations provided by Section
548.6 Moreover, there are other statutes that provide longer
limitation periods on actions brought by government agencies.
An action brought by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to
recover a fraudulent transfer, for example, “is subject to the
limitations periods set out in the Internal Revenue Code, not
the statute of limitations set forth in the state fraudulent-
transfers law,” and the IRS, therefore, has ten years to recover
under Section 6502 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).7
Similarly, fraudulent transfer actions brought by federal
creditors pursuant to the Federal Debt Collection Procedures
Act (FDCPA) are subject to a six-year statute of limitations.8
Courts have disagreed about whether the IRC and the
FDCPA constitute “applicable law” under Section 544(b), such
that a claim held by a government creditor under the fraudulent
transfer provisions of those statutes could be derivatively
asserted by a trustee.9 For example, in In re Mirant Corp., the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the FDCPA did
not constitute applicable law under Section 544(b),10 while in In
re Tronox Inc., the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the
FDCPA was, in fact, applicable law.11 These cases illustrate
“that there is no judicial consensus concerning the issue,” but
rather “ongoing judicial disagreement.”12
4 See In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2014); In
reMoore, 608 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2010).
5 In re Equip. Acquisition, 742 F.3d at 745 (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
160/5(a)(2), 160/10 (2016)).
6 See, e.g., In re Tronox Inc., 503 B.R. 239, 266–67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
7 In re Kaiser, 525 B.R. 697, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014) (applying 26 U.S.C.
§ 6502 (2012)).
8 28 U.S.C. § 3306 (2012); see also In re Tronox, 503 B.R. at 272 (“[T]he
FDCPA provides . . . a six-year statute of limitations from the date of the challenged
transfer . . . .”).
9 See Steven J. Boyajian, Continued Disagreement: Use of Federal Debt
Collection Laws to Expand Fraudulent Transfer Look-Back Periods, 34 AM. BANKR.
INST. J., 30, 30–31 (2015); Robert W. Miller, Overtime for Estate Representatives
Stepping into the Shoes of the U.S., 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24–25 (2014).
10 In reMirant Corp., 675 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 2012).
11 In re Tronox, 503 B.R. at 273–74.
12 Boyajian, supra note 9, at 31, 87.
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This note will examine the ongoing conflict over
whether Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the
trustee to take advantage of the extended statute of limitations
available to federal creditors under the FDCPA and IRC. Part I
will discuss the nature of fraudulent conveyances, the derivative
powers of the trustee under Section 544(b), the statutory remedies
available to private and government creditors, and provide an
overview of the relevant cannons of construction. Part II will
examine the facts and reasoning employed by courts that have
refused to allow the trustee to step into the government
creditor’s shoes under Section 544(b). Part III will examine
cases in which courts have opted to allow the trustee to step
into the government creditor’s shoes. Finally, Part IV will
analyze the results produced by these two divergent lines of
cases and evaluate which approach is superior. This note will
argue that the expansive nature of the plain text of Section
544(b) creates a powerful presumption in favor of treating the
FDCPA and IRC as applicable law and that the evidence
typically used to discourage courts from treating Section 544(b)
as such is insufficient to overcome this presumption.
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Before undertaking a detailed analysis of whether or not
the IRC and the FDCPA constitute applicable law under
Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, an examination of the
statutes at issue is necessary. Specifically, a measure of
background information on the nature of fraudulent transfers
and state law means of redressing them outside of bankruptcy is
essential, as is an understanding of how and why, in bankruptcy,
Section 544(b) endows the trustee with the power to claw back the
fraudulent transfers a private creditor could have avoided outside
of bankruptcy pursuant to those state statutes. It is also helpful to
understand the more expansive statutory fraudulent conveyance
remedies that are available to certain government creditors
under the IRC and FDCPA. Finally, since the question posed by
this note is, at root, a question of statutory interpretation, it is
necessary to review the relevant cannons of construction.
A. Fraudulent Conveyances, the UFTA, and UFCA
Legislative concern with those who seek to frustrate the
collection efforts of creditors by transferring their assets to
friendly third parties is hardly a new phenomenon; transferring
your beach house to your uncle for mere pennies on the eve of
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bankruptcy has always been illegal. And, in fact, laws designed
to target and unwind suspicious conveyances have a rich
statutory history, dating back13 to the 1571 Statute of
Elizabeth, which was enacted to combat “a common practice
where a debtor would transfer property to a friend or other
reliable third party and seek sanctuary in a church or other
protected place where creditors could not enter.”14 After
retreating to sanctuary, the unscrupulous “debtor would live
there, continuing to enjoy the income from the transferred
property until creditors agreed to accept a discounted
settlement.”15 The final step of the scheme would be effectuated
after settlement, when “the transferee would reconvey the
property back to the debtor, who would, now debt-free, live
happily ever after.”16 The Statute of Elizabeth gave creditors
the ability to petition a court to unwind transfers made with
intent17 to “hinder, delay or defraud creditors.”18
The modern statutory framework for addressing
fraudulent transfers is embodied in the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (UFTA) and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act (UFCA), “which are uniform statutes proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and recommended for state adoption.”19 These model statutes
have been tremendously influential; in fact, “[t]he majority of
states have enacted the UFTA. A minority of states, including
New York and Maryland, still follow the . . . UFCA.”20 Although
the vast majority of creditors in the United States will thus be
13 As Jon Travis Powers notes, even the Statute of Elizabeth simply restated
Roman common law principles: “If a debtor during the times of the Roman Empire
committed an act or forbearance that diminished his assets such that his creditors would
not receive their due, the debtor was deemed to have committed a fraud upon those
creditors and the transaction was avoidable.” Jon Travis Powers, Fraudulent Transfer
Liability under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: For Statute of Limitations
Purposes, Is Such Liability Grounded in Fraud or Created by Statute?, 20 NORTON J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 563, 566 (2011).
14 Id. at 566 (quoting Lee B. Shepard, Beyond Moody: A Re-Examination of
Unreasonably Small Capital, 57 Hastings L.J. 891, 897–98 (2005–06)).
15 Id. (quoting Shephard, supra note 14, at 898).
16 Id. (quoting Shephard, supra note 14, at 898).
17 Interestingly, the intent requirement of the statute rendered it somewhat
ineffectual, necessitating the development of the common law badges of fraud doctrine.
Id. at 565. For additional information on badges of fraud, see infra note 25.
18 Powers, supra note 13, at 565 (quoting In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197, 1199–
200 (9th Cir. 1984)).
19 Alan N. Resnick, Finding the Shoes That Fit: How Derivative Is the
Trustee’s Power to Avoid Fraudulent Conveyances Under Section 544(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 205, 207–08 (2009).
20 Id. at 208 (footnotes omitted).
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able to pursue remedies under one of these uniform statutes, it
is worth noting that “a few states have non-uniform statutes.”21
The UFTA and UFCA operate in a manner much like the
Statute of Elizabeth. Under these modern uniform statutory
schemes, fraudulent transfers are divided into two broad
categories: actual and constructive.22 Under the UFTA and
UFCA, actual fraudulent transfers occur when “a transfer or
obligation . . . is made or incurred with ‘actual intent’ to
‘hinder, delay or defraud’ creditors of the debtor.”23 As under
the common law doctrine employed by courts to increase the
efficacy of the Statute of Elizabeth,24 actual intent to defraud
can be inferred from “badges of fraud.”25 Even when badges of
fraud are taken into account, however, the evidentiary bar for
demonstrating actual intent to defraud creditors is rather high.
Accordingly, the modern statutory schemes go even further
than the expansive construction given to the Statute of
21 Id.
22 See id. at 208–09; U.F.T.A. § 4 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1984); U.F.C.A. §§ 4–7 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 1918).
23 Resnick, supra note 19, at 208 (citing U.F.T.A. § 4 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1984); U.F.C.A. § 7 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
ONUNIF. STATE LAWS 1918)).
24 See supra note 17.
25 Resnick, supra note 19, at 208. Badges of fraud include whether:
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after
the transfer;
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had
been sued or threatened with suit;
(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets;
(6) the debtor absconded;
(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred;
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer
was made or the obligation was incurred;
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt
was incurred; and
(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who
transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
Id. at 208–09 (citing U.F.T.A. § 4(b) & cmt. 5).
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Elizabeth26 by including provisions that address constructive
fraudulent conveyance. In essence, “[a] constructive fraudulent
conveyance is one that is not predicated on the debtor’s
intentions or motivations, but is based on the debtor’s transfer of
assets for less than reasonably equivalent value while
experiencing a poor financial condition.”27 Thus, conveyances
made in exchange for less-than-reasonable value will generally
be deemed fraudulent under the statutes when “the debtor was
insolvent at the time of the transfer.”28 Furthermore, such
exchanges are considered fraudulent if they occur when a debtor
undertakes or prepares to undertake a venture that could not
reasonably be supported by his remaining assets, or when
“the debtor intended[,] . . . believed or reasonably should have
believed that it would incur[] debts beyond its ability to pay as
such debts become due.”29 These provisions sweep broadly,
enveloping debtor conduct that, while perhaps overambitious or
imprudent, may be free of any nefarious intent—such as that of
the cash-strapped merchant who sells an asset cheaply and
quickly to cover key operating expenses that are coming due
while he waits for his business prospects to improve.
State fraudulent transfer schemes typically provide
four-year statutes of limitation.30 However, the limitation
period can be longer in some states; New York’s version of the
statute, for example, provides a six-year statute of limitations.31
In total, “80 percent of the states use four-year statutes of
limitations, [while] four [states] use six-year statutes of
limitations.”32 Six years appears to be the outer boundary of
limitations periods under pure statutory schemes, as “only
Virginia has a potentially longer statute of limitations, as it
only limits fraudulent conveyance actions by using the
26 Note that while the original Statute of Elizabeth did not contain a
description of constructive fraudulent conveyance, American statutes adopting the same
name sometimes did. See, e.g., In re Pfister, No. 09-05670-HB, 2012 WL 1144540, at *6
(Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 4, 2012) (noting that “an action lies for constructive fraudulent
transfer [under the Statute of Elizabeth] if (1) debtor makes a transfer but does not
receive ‘valuable consideration’ in return; (2) debtor was indebted to [creditor] at the time
of transfer; and (3) debtor does not have sufficient property to pay his debt to [creditor] in
full”) (quoting In re S. Textile Knitters, 65 F. App’x 426, 435 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d, No. 7:2-
1825-HMH (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2012), rev’d, 749 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2014)).
27 Resnick, supra note 19, at 209.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir.
2014) (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/5(a)(2), 160/10 (2016)).
31 Resnick, supra note 19, at 213.
32 Miller, supra note 9, at 24.
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equitable doctrine of laches.”33 Thus, as demonstrated by the
foregoing, a creditor seeking to increase his recovery may unwind
actually or constructively fraudulent conveyances under a state’s
version of the UFCA or UFTA—but only if he brings an action
within four, or in rarer cases, six, years.
B. The Derivative Power of the Trustee Under Section
544(b)
When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, most judicial
proceedings against the debtor and property of the debtor are
automatically stayed.34 Thus, creditors are stayed from bringing
or continuing actions to recover property that was fraudulently
transferred by the debtor pre-petition. The standing to bring
fraudulent transfer actions passes to the trustee, pursuant to
Bankruptcy Code Sections 548 and 544(b).35 Section 544(b)
endows the trustee with the power to “avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by
the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor
holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section
502 . . . or that is not allowable only under section 502(e).”36
This provision, in short, allows the trustee “to ‘stand in the shoes’
and assert the rights of the particular unsecured creditor.”37
However, while the cause of action belonged to a single
creditor, “any property the trustee recovers becomes estate
property and is divided pro rata among all general creditors.”38
Thus, Section 544(b) is “derivative of state law” and “enables
the trustee to do in a bankruptcy proceeding what a creditor
would have been able to do outside of bankruptcy—except the
trustee will recover the property for the benefit of the estate.”39
The creditor in whose shoes the trustee stands is “sometimes
referred to as a triggering or golden creditor,” and the nature of
that creditor’s identity “has important implications for a trustee’s
cause of action because the trustee becomes subject to the same
defenses that a [transferee] defendant could have raised
against the triggering creditor, including the expiration of a
33 Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing In re Porter, 37 B.R. 56, 66 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1984)).
34 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
35 As noted previously, Section 548, the Bankruptcy Code’s internal
fraudulent conveyance provision, is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See id.
§ 548(a)(1).
36 Id. § 544(b)(1).
37 Resnick, supra note 19, at 205.
38 In reMoore, 608 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2010).
39 In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2014).
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statute of limitations.”40 Thus, inside bankruptcy, the trustee has
the power to bring any fraudulent transfer actions that an
unsecured creditor could have commenced outside bankruptcy
and—provided that the trustee can overcome any defenses to
which the triggering unsecured creditor would have been
subject—may recover the value of the transferred property for the
benefit of the estate.
C. The Rights of Government Creditors Under the FDCPA
and IRC
Because the trustee is subject to all defenses that a
transferee defendant could have raised against the triggering
creditor,41 the trustee is generally forced to rely upon the
limitations periods available to creditors as of the petition date in
order to avoid fraudulent transfers.42 This can create
complications in certain cases, for while most creditors are subject
to a four-year statute of limitations under the relevant state’s
version of the UFTA or UFCA,43 a select group of creditors,
including—most notably—the federal government, have the
benefit of statutes of limitation that are longer than those
provided under the UFTA and UFCA.
For example, “[t]he IRS has at least a ten year lookback
period and its rights supersede any statute of limitations under
state law.”44 This power originates in Section 6502 of the
Internal Revenue Code,45 which states, in relevant part, that
[w]here the assessment of any tax imposed by this title has been
made within the period of limitation properly applicable thereto,
such tax may be collected by levy or by a proceeding in court, but
only if the levy is made or the proceeding begun . . . within 10 years
after the assessment of the tax.46
40 Boyajian, supra note 9, at 30.
41 See id.
42 In re Polichuk, No. 08-10783ELF, 2010 WL 4878789, at *3 n.9 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. Nov. 23, 2010).
43 See, e.g., In re Equip. Acquisition, 742 F.3d at 745 (citing 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 160/5(a)(2), 160/10 (2016)); Miller, supra note 9, at 24. For further discussion of
statutory limitations periods under the UFCA and UFTA, see supra Section I.A.
44 In re Polichuk, 2010 WL 4878789, at *3 n.9 (internal citation omitted)
(citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 6501, 6502 (2012)).
45 See In re Vaughan Co., 498 B.R. 297, 303 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013) (noting
that “Section 6502 of the Internal Revenue Code . . . provides a ten-year statute of
limitations for collection of taxes by the IRS”).
46 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a). Note that the statute provides a number of qualified
exceptions to this general rule, however, none these exceptions are relevant to the
present discussion, and so they are accordingly omitted.
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The result is that the IRS enjoys “a 10-year statute of
limitations to collect taxes that have already been assessed” and
may, “following an assessment, . . . employ state law, including its
fraudulent transfer law, to avoid a transfer within 10 years.”47
The federal government enjoys a similarly extended
limitations period on fraudulent conveyance actions brought
under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act. The FDCPA
is a “fraudulent conveyance statute . . . under which the United
States can pursue its claims.”48 This statute provides, in
relevant part, that “[a] claim for relief with respect to a
fraudulent transfer or obligation . . . is extinguished unless
action is brought . . . within 6 years after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred.”49 The FDCPA is
substantially similar to the UFTA50 and allows the government to
unwind conveyances that are actually fraudulent (i.e., made
“with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor”)51
or constructively fraudulent (i.e., made “without receiving a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer . . . [when]
the debtor is insolvent at that time [of the transfer] or the debtor
becomes insolvent as a result of the transfer”).52 Thus, taken as a
whole, “[t]he FDCPA regulates the ability of the federal
government to pursue debts and provides a public right of action
to avoid fraudulent conveyances, which incorporates the UFTA
almost verbatim,” but which provides a six-year, rather than
four-year, limitations period.53
The net result is that since “neither the U.S. nor the
IRS is bound by state law statutes of limitations when
pursuing fraudulent transfers,” nor is the government “subject
to the defense of laches when enforcing its rights,”54
government creditors have access to extended limitations
periods, regardless of what remedies would be available to
similarly-situated private creditors. Thus, when a government
creditor seeks to unwind an actually or constructively fraudulent
47 Miller, supra note 9, at 24.
48 In re Tronox Inc., 503 B.R. 239, 272 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). The FDCPA
defines the United States as “a Federal corporation; . . . an agency, department,
commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or . . . an instrumentality of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15)(A)–(C) (2012).
49 28 U.S.C. § 3306(b). Note that, like 26 U.S.C § 6502(a), this statute
includes a number of exceptions which are omitted here because they are not relevant
to the current discussion.
50 See In re Tronox, 503 B.R. at 272.
51 In re Pfister, 2012 WL 1144540, at *5 (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 4, 2012) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 3304(b)(1)(A)), aff’d, 749 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2014).
52 Id. at *5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(1)).
53 Miller, supra note 9, at 24 (footnote omitted).
54 Id.
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conveyance, the action will be subject to a six- or ten-year
statute of limitations—meaning that the government creditor
will generally have more time to claw back the transferred
property than a private creditor, who, in eighty percent of states,
will be constrained by a four-year statute of limitations.55
Government creditors’ access to longer limitations
periods than those available to their private counterparts finds
its root in the common law doctrine generally styled as nullum
tempus occurrit regi, or “no time runs against the king.”56 The
nullum tempus doctrine “has been used to refer to a sovereign’s
immunity from statutes of limitation.”57 This broad principle
“finds its modern justification in the policy that public rights,
revenues, and property should not be forfeited due to the
negligence of public officials.”58 The doctrine is most clearly
articulated, at least as far as the federal court system is
concerned, in United States v. Summerlin, wherein the Court
stated that “[i]t is well settled that the United States is not bound
by state statutes of limitation or subject to the defense of laches in
enforcing its rights.”59 This is the case “whether the United States
brings its suit in its own courts or in a state court.”60
While powerful and well established, the nullum tempus
doctrine is subject to a key limitation: “when not enforcing a
public right or a public interest, the sovereign is not shielded
by nullum tempus occurrit regi.”61 Thus, “if an action brought in
the name of the United States does not involve public rights or
interests, state statutes of limitation typically apply.”62 In such
instances, “the federal government functions as a mere conduit
for the enforcement of private rights which could have been
enforced by the private parties themselves.”63 As is so often the
case in matters of law, this seemingly discrete and tidy exception
is not unqualified; instead, there are certain conditions, the
fulfillment of which takes a case outside of the public right
exception—that is to say, there are exceptions to the exception.
Most significantly, private government action can still be
55 See id.
56 In re Vaughan Co., 498 B.R. 297, 304 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013) (citing S.E.C.
v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1993)).
57 Romualdo P. Eclavea et al., Doctrine of Governmental Immunity, in 51 AM.
JUR. 2d LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 63 (2017).
58 In re Vaughan, 498 B.R. at 304 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Rind, 991 F.2d at 1491).
59 United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940).
60 Id.
61 Miller, supra note 9, at 25.
62 In re Vaughan, 498 B.R. at 304 (citing Marshall v. Intermountain Elec. Co.,
614 F.2d 260, 262 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980)).
63 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citingMarshall, 614 F.2d at 262 n.3).
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shielded from state statutes of limitation in cases where
Congress so intended; as one court put it, “a state’s statute of
limitations does not apply ‘to an action brought by the federal
government to vindicate public rights or public interests, absent a
clear showing of contrary congressional intent.’”64 Thus, even
where a government actor attempts to enforce a private right, he
may properly avail himself of the government’s sovereign power
and shield himself from state statutes of limitation, so long as
Congress intentionally authorized him to do so. In short, federal
access to extended statutes of limitation finds its historical root
in the nullum tempus doctrine; while generally this doctrine
only shields government creditors when they are enforcing
public rights, it also shields them when they enforce private
rights with clear congressional authorization.
D. Cannons of Construction
As discussed above, Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code allows the trustee to step into the shoes of an unsecured
creditor, bring any fraudulent transfer actions that the creditor
may have had prior to the petition date, and claw back that
property (or its value) into the estate. Furthermore, as
explained in Sections I.B and I.C, most private creditors who
seek to unwind fraudulent conveyances are bound by a four-
year statute of limitations under state versions of the UFTA or
UFCA, while federal creditors have access to six- and ten-year
statutes of limitation under the FDCPA and IRC. Taking all
this in sum, the question that arises is whether the FDCPA
and IRC—statutes that originate in a uniquely governmental
power—constitute applicable law under Section 544(b) such
that the trustee would be able to step into the shoes of the
triggering government creditor for the purpose of unwinding a
fraudulent transfer that occurred outside the statute of
limitations provided by state fraudulent conveyance law. Since
government creditors, particularly the IRS, appear in bankruptcy
proceedings with great frequency,65 this question has a great
deal of practical import: “[T]he 10-year statute of
limitations . . . might be available in any case where the IRS
has already assessed taxes against the debtor,”66 enabling the
trustee to claw back any property fraudulently conveyed within
the last ten years for the benefit of the estate, thus resulting in
64 Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for Garfield Cty., Colo. v. W.H.I., Inc., 992 F.2d 1061,
1065 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Marshall, 614 F.2d at 262).
65 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 24.
66 Id.
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increased recoveries for all unsecured creditors. This question is,
at a very fundamental level, one of statutory interpretation and
requires an examination of the basic cannons of construction
that courts employ to discern congressional meaning and intent.
The Supreme Court has noted that “canons of
construction are . . . rules of thumb that help courts determine
the meaning of legislation.”67 These canons are not all created
equal. Rather, courts must look first to the plain meaning of
the text, operating with the presumption “that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it
says there.”68 Courts may “properly assume, absent sufficient
indication to the contrary, that Congress intends the words in
its enactments to carry ‘their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.’”69 Plain text analysis can—and, at times, should—be
dispositive, for when statutory text lacks facial ambiguity, the
“judicial inquiry is complete.”70
Courts are loath to depart from literal application of the
plain meaning of a statute,71 even in cases when failing to do so
produces strange results, for the mere “fact that Congress may
not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory
enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to
[the statute’s] plain meaning.”72 Thus, the Supreme Court has
held that
[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the
‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce
a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
67 Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
68 Id. at 253–54.
69 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388
(1993) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
70 Germain, 503 U.S. at 254 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Rubin v.
United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). The full quote from Rubin is, “When . . . the
terms of a statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except ‘in “rare and
exceptional circumstances’”[;] . . . [n]o such circumstances are present here . . . .” Rubin,
449 U.S. at 430 (internal citations omitted). The court does not, in that opinion, specify
the exceptional circumstances that would generally be required to trigger further
review. For more information on circumstances that require the court to look beyond
the terms of the statute, see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
71 This sentiment is articulated well by the In re Kane court:
Courts find it easiest to reform a statute when the suspect text makes no
sense whatever. It is somewhat harder when the text makes literal sense but
it is absurd, or when applying it would lead to an absurd result. It is hardest
to do when . . . the text makes sense but yields a perverse result. The more
substantive the change, the more wary a court must be about making it.
In re Kane, 336 B.R. 477, 486 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (footnotes omitted).
72 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 158 (1991).
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drafters.’ . . . In such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than
the strict language, controls.73
In keeping with this notion that the statute may not be given
literal effect when doing so would produce a result demonstrably
at odds with the intentions of the drafters, courts are
required—for example—“to interpret the words of a statute in
context. . . . ‘A statute should be construed so that effect is
given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant.’”74
When the plain meaning of the statutory language is
unclear or would produce a result at odds with the intention of
the law, courts often seek guidance from the legislative history.
However, “[r]eliance on legislative history in divining the intent
of Congress is, as has often been observed, a step to be taken
cautiously.”75 Thus, courts “must be wary against interpolating
[their] notions of policy in the interstices of legislative
provisions.”76 This strong legal tradition of generally avoiding
searching inquiries of the legislative record in order to discern
intent exists because, as “Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote
more than 100 years ago, ‘[W]e do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.’”77
Thus, as always, “[w]hether or not legislative history is ever
relevant, it need not be consulted when . . . the statutory text is
unambiguous.”78 Any analysis of Section 544(b), the IRC, or the
FDCPA therefore, should lend great weight to the plain words
of the statutory text and accord only subordinate value to
legislative history.
Before concluding this section, it is important to note
that one of the two candidates for “applicable law” examined in
this note contains an intratextual cannon of construction that
restricts the manner in which it is to be read and qualifies its
provisions. Section 3003 of the FDCPA, entitled “[r]ules of
construction,” declares that “[t]his chapter shall not be construed
to supersede or modify the operation of . . . title 11.”79 Thus, any
73 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458
U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
74 Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 181–86 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)).
75 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
76 Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942).
77 In re Kane, 336 B.R. 477, 485–86 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (alteration in
original) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12
HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899)).
78 United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557, 567 n.5 (2013).
79 28 U.S.C. § 3003(c)(1) (2012).
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reading of the FDCPA that causes it to supersede or modify the
Bankruptcy Code will be invalid, as it will plainly contradict
both the clear textual constraints of the statute and the
intentions of its drafters.
Determining whether the FDCPA and the IRC constitute
applicable law within the meaning of Section 544(b) is, at root, an
exercise in statuary interpretation. In engaging in such
interpretation, the primary focus should be on the plain
meaning of the statutory texts at issue. While legislative intent
might, at times, shed light on the meaning of those texts, such
evidence should be viewed with a degree of skepticism and
should be used only to illumine—rather than contravene—the
plain meaning of the text. Finally, when examining the FDCPA, it
is essential to refrain from construing the text in a manner that
would cause it to supersede or modify the operation of the
Bankruptcy Code.
II. MIRANT, VAUGHAN, AND THE CASE AGAINST APPLICABLE
LAW
Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy code empowers the
trustee to unwind any fraudulent transfer that an unsecured
creditor would have been able to unwind pursuant to a claim
under applicable law. As discussed previously, fraudulent
conveyance claims of this sort will typically be subject to a four-
year statute of limitations under the relevant state’s version of
the UFTA or UFCA. Government creditors, however, have
access to six- or ten-year statutes of limitation under the
FDCPA and IRC, creating a question as to whether the FDCPA
and IRC constitute applicable law under Section 544(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code such that the trustee would have access to
the extended limitation periods provided by those statutes.
Some courts have argued that the FDCPA and IRC should not
be treated as applicable law under Section 544(b). This section
will analyze two major decisions holding the FDCPA and/or
IRC inapplicable law: In re Mirant80 and In re Vaughan.81
A. In re Mirant
In re Mirant arose after Mirant, an energy company,
attempted to acquire nine power islands by acting through a
subsidiary in an effort to expand its European operations.82
80 In reMirant Corp., 675 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2012).
81 In re Vaughan Co., 498 B.R. 297 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013).
82 In re Mirant, 675 F.3d at 532.
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Commerzbank financed the transaction by providing a loan to
the subsidiary and required Mirant to guarantee the loan.83
Shortly thereafter, the power island deal fell through, and
Mirant—after making payments on the loan pursuant to the
guarantee—filed a Chapter 11 petition.84
Mirant, now acting as debtor-in-possession,85 sued
Commerzbank in an effort “to avoid the Guaranty and to
recover the funds Mirant paid pursuant to the Guaranty.”86
Commerzbank responded to the suit by filing a motion for
dismissal, arguing that Mirant87 lacked standing and failed to
state a claim because it could not avail itself of the FDCPA
under Section 544(b).88 The bankruptcy court converted the
motion to one for summary judgment.89 Thereafter, the
bankruptcy court issued proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law to the district court, which found that, while Mirant
possessed standing, summary judgment was appropriate because
the FDCPA was not applicable law under Section 544(b).90
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s
ruling that the FDCPA did not constitute applicable law under
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 The court noted that, while Mirant was a debtor-in-possession rather than
a trustee, the distinction was irrelevant for purposes of its eventual 544(b) analysis. Id.
at 532 n.1 (“Although Mirant was a debtor-in-possession, the issues in this case focus
primarily on the powers of a bankruptcy trustee. This is because a debtor-in-possession
has many of the powers of a bankruptcy trustee.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012)
(“Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter, and to
such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have
all the rights, other than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title, and
powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties, except the duties specified in
sections 1106(a)(2), (3), and (4) of this title, of a trustee serving in a case under this
chapter.”).
86 In re Mirant, 675 F.3d at 532.
87 Mirant’s Bankruptcy plan resulted in “the creation of a special litigation
entity” called MC Asset Recovery, LLC (MCAR), which was “substituted into the case
for Mirant.” Id. Since the distinction is not relevant to the current discussion, this note
will refer to both Mirant and MCAR as “Mirant.”
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. Boyjian provides more information on the reasoning employed by the
bankruptcy court:
[T]he U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas held that the
FDCPA was not applicable law under § 544(b)(1) because, the court believed,
the FDCPA evinces a congressional intent that it should be employed solely
for the benefit of the U.S. The bankruptcy court based its reasoning on the
fact that under “section 3306 of the FDCPA, transfers may be avoided ‘to the
extent [that is] necessary to satisfy the debt to the United States.’”
Boyajian, supra note 9, at 31 (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting
In re Mirant Corp., No. 03-046590 (DML), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 6389, at *43 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2010)).
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Section 544(b).91 The decision hinged, in part, on an application
of Section 3003 of the FDCPA, which provides that “[t]his
chapter shall not be construed to supersede or modify the
operation of . . . title 11.”92 Mirant argued that “[Section] 3003(c)’s
mandate that the FDCPA not modify or supersede Title 11 is
only fulfilled by seamlessly incorporating the FDCPA into
the [B]ankruptcy [C]ode,” while Commerzbank “argue[d] that
allowing the trustee to use the FDCPA as ‘applicable law’ under
§ 544(b) will necessarily ‘modify’ Title 11.”93 The court looked to
a previous case, which had held that similar antimodification
language in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) prevented it from preempting a state property law
because such preemption would modify the operation of the
Bankruptcy Code’s exemption provisions.94 The court analogized
the FDCPA to ERISA, ultimately siding with Commerzbank and
concluding that “treating the FDCPA as applicable law under
544(b) would impermissibly modify the operation of Title 11.”95
The court buttressed this opinion by “rel[ying] on the
FDCPA’s legislative history as a further indicator that the
FDCPA should not be considered ‘applicable law.’”96
Particularly, the court drew attention to a remark by Committee
Chairman Brooks:
As the author of the final version of the Federal Debt Collection
Procedures Act, to which the Senate has now formally agreed, I want
to discuss some aspects of the legislation to make sure they are fully
understood . . . . The act makes several clarifications to resolve
potential ambiguities in its application or in its effect on other laws.
One of those clarifications is that the act “shall not be construed to
supersede or modify the operation of * * * title 11,” United States
Code—the Bankruptcy Code. This provision was carefully worded to
make clear that the act would have absolutely no effect on the
Bankruptcy Code; even provisions of the Bankruptcy Code making
reference to nonbankruptcy law are to be read as if this act did not
exist. The only exception is the provision in section 201 of the act,
which amends a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code.97
91 In re Mirant, 675 F.3d at 536.
92 Id. at 535 (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 3003 (2012)).
93 Id.
94 Id. (citing Matter of Volpe, 943 F.2d 1451, 1451–53 (5th Cir. 1991)). The
specific antimodification provision at issue in Volpe was 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988). In
re Mirant, 675 F.3d at 535.
95 In re Mirant, 675 F.3d at 535.
96 Miller, supra note 9, at 25.
97 In re Mirant, 675 F.3d at 535–36 (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. H13288 (daily ed.
Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Jack Brooks)).
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The court observed that this remark “is not dispositive, [but] it
does support the Court’s determination that the FDCPA is not
applicable law under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).”98
B. In re Vaughan
In re Vaughan centered on a realty company that Douglas
Vaughan had operated as a Ponzi scheme.99 After the Vaughan
Company Realtors filed a bankruptcy petition, the trustee
endeavored to recover funds that had been transferred from the
Vaughan Company to Ultima Homes, Inc. for the purpose of
financing the construction of Douglas Vaughan’s personal
residence.100 When Ultima contended that fraudulent transfer
actions would be time-barred, the trustee “assert[ed] that she
[was] immune from the four-year statute of limitations that
ordinarily applies to state law fraudulent transfer claims
because Section 544(b) permit[ted] her to use the ten-year look
back period available to the IRS.”101
The bankruptcy court was highly skeptical of the
trustee’s argument. The court began by declaring that “[i]n
expounding a statute, [the Court] must not be guided by a
single sentence or member of a sentence, but [must] look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”102 The
court then noted that the IRS’s immunity from the state
statute of limitations derived from the nullum tempus occurit
regi doctrine, before observing that
[t]he application of nullum tempus is not without limits. . . . Such
power may only be used to enforce public rights and protect public
interests. . . . Therefore, if an action brought in the name of the
United States does not involve public rights or interests, state
statutes of limitation typically apply.103
The court then concluded that Congress did not intend Section
544(b) “to vest sovereign powers in a bankruptcy trustee and
98 In re Mirant, 675 F.3d at 535.
99 In re Vaughan Co., 498 B.R. 297, 300–01 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013).
100 See id. at 301.
101 Id. at 302.
102 Id. at 304 (quoting United States v. Lamirand, 669 F.3d 1091, 1096 (10th
Cir. 2012)).
103 Id. at 303–04 (internal citations omitted). The court supports this proposition
by citingMarshall v. Intermountain Electric Co., 614 F.2d 260, 262–63, 262 n.3 (10th Cir.
1980) (“An action which, although brought in the name of the United States, involves no
public rights or interests may be subject to a state statute of limitations. In such a case
the federal government functions as a mere conduit for the enforcement of private rights
which could have been enforced by the private parties themselves.”), and S.E.C. v. Calvo,
378 F.3d 1211, 1218 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Where . . . the government’s action vindicates a
private interest, the [state statute of limitations] defense is typically available.”).
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thereby immunize her from the strictures of state law in the
pursuit of her private interests.”104 Such a policy would be
impermissible, the court suggested, for “[i]f the federal
government were to delegate the exercise of its sovereign
powers in such circumstances, it would pervert the purpose of
nullum tempus, which is to immunize the federal government
from certain state laws.”105 Furthermore, the court reasoned,
even assuming, arguendo, that Congress did intend to delegate
sovereign powers to the trustee, the trustee would still be
unable to exercise said power to vindicate a private right.106
The court declared that this conclusion would effectuate
Congress’s intent, noting that because “[t]he IRS holds an
unsecured claim in a substantial portion of bankruptcy cases,”
allowing the “trustee or debtor in possession [to] recover transfers
made within ten years before the petition date . . . would
eviscerate the UFTA’s four-year look back period in most
bankruptcy cases,” thereby subordinating, rather than
incorporating, state law.107 Ultimately, the court was “unwilling
to draw an inference that Congress intended such a dramatic
change in the law,”108 and so justified its holding.
III. TRONOX, KAISER, AND THE CASE FOR APPLICABLE LAW
Part II of this note explored the dispute over whether
the IRC and FDCPA constitute applicable law under the meaning
of Section 544(b) and examined two key cases articulating
rationales for not treating these statutes as applicable law. This
part turns, in sequence, to the opposite side of the coin,
examining two major decisions holding that these statutory
schemes are, in fact, applicable law under Section 544(b)—In re
Tronox109 and In re Kaiser.110
A. In re Tronox
In In re Tronox, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York concluded that the FDCPA constituted
applicable law under Section 544(b), explicitly rejecting the
Fifth Circuit’s holding in Mirant. The case arose from a rather
convoluted factual background, but can be—for purposes of this
104 In re Vaughan, 498 B.R. at 304.
105 Id. at 304-05.
106 Id. at 305.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 306.
109 In re Tronox Inc., 503 B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
110 In re Kaiser, 525 B.R. 697 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).
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note—sufficiently summarized as follows: “the debtors sought
to avoid, as a fraudulent transfer, a spinoff transaction through
which they were left with minimal assets and substantial
environmental and tort liabilities.”111 After defendants raised a
statute of limitations defense, “the debtors argued that their
claims were viable due to the six-year look-back period provided
under the FDCPA. The defendants, relying on Mirant, responded
that the FDCPA was not applicable law under § 544(b).”112 The
Tronox court, rejectingMirant’s persuasive authority, determined
that “[t]reating the FDCPA as ‘applicable law’ does not ‘modify’ or
‘supercede’ the operation of the Bankruptcy Code, and a holding
that the Code ‘should be read as if the FDCPA did not exist’ gives
too much weight to a comment in the legislative history.”113
The court further rejected the Mirant court’s assertion
that the FDCPA existed for the exclusive use of the federal
government, noting that like the FDCPA, the
UFTA is also a remedy for the “exclusive use” of creditors who can sue
under that statute. It is incorporated in Federal law because of the
operation of § 544(b), not because of anything contained in its own
text, and there is no reason to treat the FDCPA any differently.114
In short, while the UFTA is a remedy for a particular kind of
creditor outside bankruptcy, the Code clearly lets the trustee
bring those creditors’ claims on behalf of the estate once a
petition has been filed. It follows that the mere fact that the
FDCPA is a remedy for a particular type of creditor outside
bankruptcy forms no basis for assuming the trustee’s use of its
provisions within bankruptcy is impermissible.115
B. In Re Kaiser
In re Kaiser arose from circumstances in which a
businessman who possessed ownership interests in many
corporations made “a series of transfers benefiting his relatives”
before filing a Chapter 7 petition.116 The court noted the policy
concerns defendant raised when faced with the threat of the
trustee stepping into the shoes of the IRS pursuant to Section
111 Boyajian, supra note 9, at 87.
112 Id.
113 In re Tronox, 503 B.R. at 273.
114 Boyajian, supra note 9, at 87 (quoting In re Tronox, 503 B.R. at 274).
115 The nullum tempus argument appears to be a more robust variation on the
“exclusive use” argument addressed here—one that posits that private and government
creditors are qualitatively different, and so should be treated differently inside
bankruptcy. This argument was articulated by the Vaughan Court and is discussed supra
Section II.B. and infra Section IV.A.
116 In re Kaiser, 525 B.R. 697, 702 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).
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544(b): “this would make the ‘normal’ statute of limitations
meaningless as every case potentially involves IRS claims,
and . . . [that] there may exist a disproportionate ratio between
the small amounts owed to the IRS and the potentially large
amounts sought to be recovered for creditors.”117 The court then
addressed these concerns, and rejected them:
With respect to the concern that the use of the FDCPA would modify
the operation of the Bankruptcy Code, the court responded that
“[s]ection 544 is simply an enabling formula. What variables are input
into section 544 will always change the result, but that is not a
modification of either section 544’s operation or the operation of Title
11 as a whole.” Finally, with respect to the concerns that incorporation
of the government’s advantageous look-back periods would vest
sovereign powers in a bankruptcy trustee, the court responded that
although the government “creditor’s ability to trump the applicable
state statute of limitations might derive from its sovereign
immunity . . . the estate representative’s ability to override that same
limitation derives from § 544(b).”118
Ultimately, “[t]he court decided that these policy concerns were
irrelevant given § 544(b)’s lack of ambiguity, and further, that
the concerns were misplaced.”119
IV. ANALYSIS
Thus far, this note has discussed the derivative power
that Section 544(b) confers on the trustee, and examined cases
that present arguments for why this provision should or should
not be read as empowering the trustee to take advantage of the
extended statutes of limitation available to federal creditors
under the FDCPA and IRC. The sharp judicial disagreement on
this topic indicates that the question is a rather close one.
Assuredly, courts on both sides of the issue have fairly compelling
arguments, and there appears to be room for legitimate
disagreement about the true meaning of Section 544(b).
The cases discussed in Part II advance a limited number
of discrete arguments for holding the IRC and FDCPA
inapplicable law under Section 544(b), each of which is
summarized and addressed below. The first argument, advanced
by the Vaughan Court, is that (1) Congress did not intend Section
544(b) to “vest [the] sovereign powers [of the nullum tempus
doctrine] in a bankruptcy trustee and thereby immunize her
117 Id. at 711.
118 Boyajian, supra note 9, at 87 (footnotes omitted) (quoting In re Tronox, 503
B.R. at 274).
119 Id.
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from the strictures of state law in the pursuit of her private
interests,”120 and (2) even if Congress did intend to delegate
sovereign powers to the trustee, the trustee would still be
unable to exercise derivative nullum tempus powers to
vindicate a private right.121 The second argument, advanced by
the Mirant Court, is that “treating the FDCPA as applicable
law under 544(b) would impermissibly modify the operation of
Title 11,”122 in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 3003(c)(1)—a conclusion
buttressed by a belief that “the FDCPA’s legislative history [is]
a further indicator that the FDCPA should not be considered
‘applicable law.’”123 The final argument, raised by the defendants
in In re Kaiser, is that treating the IRC—and, presumably the
FDCPA—as applicable law “would make the ‘normal’ statute of
limitations meaningless as every case potentially involves IRS [or
other governmental] claims, and . . . [that] there may exist a
disproportionate ratio between the small amounts owed to the
IRS [or other government creditors] and the potentially large
amounts sought to be recovered for creditors.”124 Ultimately, as
this section will explain, these arguments lack sufficiently
persuasive power and are unavailing.
A. The Nullum Tempus Argument
The Vaughan Court noted that that the IRS’s immunity
from the state statutes of limitation derives from the nullum
tempus occurit regi doctrine, a doctrine rooted in the inherent
powers of the sovereign.125 The court employed strong language
to highlight its belief that this power belonged exclusively to
the sovereign, and was—essentially—nontransferable. Quoting
a District of Nebraska case, the court suggested that “[t]he
maxim nullum tempus occurrit regi . . . only applies in favor of
the sovereign power, and has no application to municipal
corporations deriving their powers from the sovereign, although
their powers, in a limited sense, are governmental,”126—with the
obvious implication being that the same constraints apply to
individuals who act in quasi-governmental roles, such as
trustees who step into the shoes of government creditors. The
court pushed this point further still, noting that “[i]f the federal
120 In re Vaughan Co., 498 B.R. 297, 304 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013).
121 Id. at 305.
122 In reMirant Corp., 675 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 2012).
123 Miller, supra note 9, at 25.
124 In re Kaiser, 525 B.R. 697, 711 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).
125 In re Vaughan, 498 B.R. at 304–05.
126 Id. at 305 (quoting City of Lincoln, Neb. v. Windstream Neb., Inc., 800 F.
Supp. 2d 1030, 1035 (D. Neb. 2011)).
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government were to delegate the exercise of its sovereign
powers in such circumstances, it would pervert the purpose of
nullum tempus, which is to immunize the federal government
from certain state laws.”127
This strong language works to cloak what is, essentially,
a convoluted legislative intent argument as the straightforward
application of a settled rule. In reality, it is quite clear that the
nullum tempus doctrine does not circumscribe Congress’s ability
to specifically legislate beyond the traditional bounds of the
doctrine. For example, while the doctrine generally precludes
avoidance of a state’s statute of limitations when enforcing
purely private rights, it can be invoked in such a manner so
long as the government can make a clear showing of
congressional intent.128 Even the government actor requirement
can be contravened by Congress: as Miller notes, “[a]lthough
other cases of entities stepping into the shoes of the U.S. and
wielding its sovereign immunity are sparse, American Indian
Tribes may step into the shoes of the U.S. and use nullum
tempus occurrit regi to the same extent as the U.S.”129
Thus, a mere finding that allowing the trustee to step
into the shoes of the government creditor violates traditional
principles of the nullum tempus doctrine does not resolve the
question before us. Instead, it simply creates a soft inference or
presumption that this is not what Congress intended to do. In
the instant case, the statute’s sweeping reference to applicable
law—a reference made without qualification—is sufficient to
overcome that inference. After all, “a court should always turn
first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated
time and again that courts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it
says there.”130 The mere “fact that Congress may not have
foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not
a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to [the statute’s]
plain meaning.”131 The end result is that the Vaughan Court’s
argument—that a settled tenant of the nullum tempus doctrine
evinces general congressional intent to place additional
127 Id. at 304–05.
128 See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for Garfield Cty., Colo. v. W.H.I., Inc., 992 F.2d
1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that “a state’s statute of limitations does not apply
‘to an action brought by the federal government to vindicate public rights or public
interests, absent a clear showing of contrary congressional intent’” (quoting Marshall v.
Intermountain Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 260, 262 (10th Cir. 1980))).
129 Miller, supra note 9, at 51.
130 Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).
131 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 158 (1991) (citing Toibb v. Radloff, 501
U.S. 157, 164 (1991)).
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restrictions on the effect of the statute beyond those limitations
enumerated by the statutory text—is unavailing. In short, the
doctrine finds its expression in statute and so nothing prevents
the government from, by statute, specifically extending that
right to others—such as the trustee in a bankruptcy
proceeding—and thereby partially preempting state law; where
the text appears to do so on its face, it is improper to restrict
the effect of the statute by piling inference upon inference.
The Vaughan Court also noted that
[t]he application of nullum tempus is not without limits. . . . Such
power may only be used to enforce public rights and protect public
interests. . . . Therefore, if an action brought in the name of the United
States does not involve public rights or interests, state statutes of
limitation typically apply.132
This fact led the court to conclude that even if Congress did
intend to delegate sovereign powers to the trustee, the trustee
would still be unable to exercise said power to vindicate a
private right.133 This argument is misguided in two respects.
First, it assumes that Congress lacks the ability to
statutorily convene the public right requirement of the nullum
tempus doctrine. However, as was explained above,134 while the
doctrine generally precludes avoidance of a state statute of
limitations when enforcing purely private rights, it can be
employed in such a manner so long as the government can
make a clear showing of congressional intent.135 Thus, even
where a government actor attempts to enforce a private right,
he may properly avail himself of the government’s sovereign
power and shield himself from state statutes of limitations, so
long as Congress intentionally136 authorized him to do so. The
unqualified, sweeping language of Section 544(b) suggests that
Congress both intended to and actually did create such an
exception to the doctrine.137
132 In re Vaughan, 498 B.R. at 304 (internal citations omitted).
133 Id. at 305.
134 See supra Section I.C.
135 See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for Garfield Cty., Colo. v. W.H.I., Inc., 992 F.2d
1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that “a state’s statute of limitations does not apply
‘to an action brought by the federal government to vindicate public rights or public
interests, absent a clear showing of contrary congressional intent’” (quoting Marshall v.
Intermountain Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 260, 262 (10th Cir. 1980))).
136 Or, perhaps, if we accept Holmes’s view that “[w]e do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means,” Holmes, supra note 77, at 419,
perhaps unintentional, but textual, authorization is sufficient.
137 Or, at least, such would be the case if the trustee’s use of the IRC or
FDCPA constituted enforcement of a strictly private right, which—it will be argued
infra—it does not.
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Second, the argument is misguided because it assumes
that by stepping into the shoes of the government creditor, the
trustee seeks enforcement of a purely private right. This is not
the case. As Miller noted “[c]ourts have held that the mere
potential for money to flow to the U.S. Treasury, even if it is
unlikely, is sufficient to constitute a public right.”138 When the
trustee seeks to unwind a fraudulent conveyance under the
IRC or FDCPA, he is not “function[ing] as a mere conduit for
the enforcement of private rights which could have been
enforced by the private parties themselves.”139 Rather, he, by
unwinding fraudulent transfers, concurrently enforces public
rights and private rights by increasing the pool of assets that
can be used to pay the claims of government and private
creditors. Thus, “[a]n action to recover a fraudulent transfer for
the benefit of all creditors, including the U.S., constitutes a
hybrid case of both private and public interest, subject to laches
but not state statutes of limitations.”140 In short, the nullum
tempus argument is flawed both because the text of Section
544(b) appears to suggest that Congress intended to allow the
trustee to avail himself of government sovereignty and because,
by unwinding fraudulent conveyances, the trustee enforces
what is—at least in part—a public right.
B. The Impermissible Modification Argument
The Mirant Court suggested that “treating the FDCPA
as applicable law under 544(b) would impermissibly modify the
operation of Title 11,”141 in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 3003(c)(1), the
FDCPA’s internal cannon of construction. It based its conclusion
on (1) analogizing Section 3003(c)(1)’s antimodification provision
to a similar ERISA provision, and citing a previous holding
that allowing ERISA to preempt a state property law would
produce just such impermissible modification of the Bankruptcy
Code’s exemption provisions,142 and (2) inferring legislative intent
from Chairman Brooks’s statement that “even provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code making reference to nonbankruptcy law are to
be read as if [the FDCPA] did not exist.”143 Ultimately, these
arguments rely on a strained construction of the term “modify,”
138 Miller, supra note 9, at 51.
139 In re Vaughan Co., 498 B.R. 297, 303–04 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013) (internal
quotations omitted) (quotingMarshall, 614 F.2d at 262 n.3).
140 Miller, supra note 9, at 51.
141 In reMirant Corp., 675 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 2012).
142 See id. (citing In re Volpe, 943 F.2d 1451, 1451–53 (5th Cir. 1991)).
143 Id. (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. H13288 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of
Rep. Jack Brooks)).
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and a haphazard comparison to a poor analog, and are not
sufficiently persuasive to justify excluding the FDCPA from the
category of applicable law defined by Section 544(b).
The court’s reading of Section 3003 is an odd one. It
seems inconceivable that in writing a statute for a real world of
interconnected events, Congress would include a provision that
would render the statute ineffectual whenever it interacted, in
any meaningful way, with one of the enumerated statutory
schemes. It appears far more likely that Congress employed the
term “modify” in a more limited manner. As the Kaiser Court
posited, “[s]ection 544 is simply an enabling formula. What
variables are input into section 544 will always change the
result, but that is not a modification of either section 544’s
operation or the operation of Title 11 as a whole.”144
Furthermore, with respect to Chairman Brooks’s remark, it
must be remembered that “[r]eliance on legislative history in
divining the intent of Congress is, as has often been observed, a
step to be taken cautiously.”145 A stray remark on the
legislative record should not be employed to circumvent the
clear meaning of the text, for “[w]hether or not legislative
history is ever relevant, it need not be consulted when, as here,
the statutory text is unambiguous.”146 In sum, it seems unlikely
that allowing the trustee to step into the shoes of the
government creditor would truly modify or supersede Title 11.
A conclusion to the contrary, such as that advanced by the
Mirant Court, must be built upon a very weak foundation—a
stray remark in the legislative record and a rough analogy to
the construction of a different statute.
C. Policy Arguments
The defendants in In re Kaiser raised two key policy
arguments against broad construction of Section 544(b). First,
that treating the IRC—and, presumably the FDCPA—as
applicable law “would make the ‘normal’ statute of limitations
meaningless as every case potentially involves IRS [or other
governmental] claims,” and, second, that “there may exist a
disproportionate ratio between the small amounts owed to the
IRS [or other government creditor] and the potentially large
amounts sought to be recovered for creditors.”147 At the outset,
it should be noted that “such policy concerns are secondary to
144 In re Kaiser, 525 B.R. 697, 713 n.11 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).
145 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
146 United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557, 567 n.5 (2013).
147 In re Kaiser, 525 B.R. at 711.
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the plain language of the applicable statutes.”148 After all, the
mere “fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the
consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason
for refusing to give effect to [the statute’s] plain meaning.”149
The state of the law would be in no way unsettled by
allowing the trustee to unwind large fraudulent conveyances
because of de minimis government interests. Under the
doctrine developed in Moore v. Bay, “the trustee may recover
the entire . . . fraudulent conveyance notwithstanding that the
only creditor with standing to prosecute a fraudulent conveyance
action outside of bankruptcy is owed only” a lesser sum.150
Section 544(b), thus, allows the creditor to “stand in the
‘overshoes’ of the actual creditor,”151 and the policy incentives at
issue here do not shift simply because the government, rather
than a private party, is the creditor.
It is true that in bankruptcy proceedings in which the
government is a creditor, the extended statute of limitations
would supersede the statute of limitations provided by the
relevant state’s version of the UFTA or UFCA. However, the
“trustee’s statutory duties would prevent” him from “overlooking
valid objections to IRS claims,”152 giving debtors a possibility of
escaping liability and somewhat mitigating the effect of the
policy consequences. If this policy result is truly egregious, and
“if ‘applicable law’ only truly means private law, congressional
intervention is necessary.”153
What is more, holding that the FDCPA and IRC constitute
applicable law under Section 544(b) would incentivize Congress
to write comprehensible laws by holding it to the plain
meaning of the statute it enacted. Such a holding is consistent
with the notion that “[t]he task of resolving a dispute over the
meaning of a statute begins where all such inquiries must begin:
with the language of the statute itself,”154 and that “[w]here the
language of the statute is unambiguous, no further inquiry is
necessary or appropriate.”155 Furthermore, incentivizing Congress
to act in this manner presents policy benefits—such as improving
148 Id. at 705 n.6.
149 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 158 (1991) (citing Toibb v. Radloff, 501
U.S. 157, 164 (1991)).
150 Resnick, supra note 19, at 214.
151 Id.
152 Boyajian, supra note 9, at 87 (quotations omitted) (citing In re Tronox Inc.,
503 B.R. 239, 274 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
153 Miller, supra note 9, at 51.
154 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
155 In re Kaiser, 525 B.R. at 697, 711 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing Sebelius v.
Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1895 (2013)).
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judicial economy and increasing statutory predictability—that far
outweigh the policy consequences of regularly allowing federal
statutes of limitation to supersede state fraudulent conveyance
statutes of limitation.
CONCLUSION
There has been sharp disagreement among courts about
whether the IRC and FDCPA constitute applicable law under
Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, such that the creditor
would possess the right to step into the shoes of government
creditors and take advantage of the extended statute of
limitations available to them in fraudulent conveyance actions.
An examination of the body of relevant jurisprudence suggests
that the case against treating the FDCPA and IRC as applicable
law under Section 544(b) boils down to three essential
arguments—none of which carries enough persuasive weight to
justify excluding these legislative schemes from the realm of
applicable law described by Section 544(b). The first argument,
advanced by the Vaughan Court, is that (1) Congress did not
intend Section 544(b) to endow the trustee with powers that
typically belong only to the sovereign156 and (2) even if congress
did intend to delegate sovereign powers to the trustee, the
trustee would still be unable to exercise such nullum tempus
powers to vindicate a private right.157 The second argument,
advanced by the Mirant Court, is that construing the FDCPA as
applicable law would contravene Section 3003’s antimodification
provision,158 an argument buttressed by reliance on Chairman
Brooks’s remark in the legislative record.159 The final argument,
raised by the defendants in Kaiser, is that treating the IRC—and,
presumably the FDCPA—as applicable law could have
undesirable policy consequences, such as effectively nullifying
traditional statutes of limitations or allowing private creditors to
recover disproportionately large sums as a result of de minimis
government claims.160
Each of these three arguments is critically flawed. The
nullum tempus argument is flawed because it fails to
acknowledge that while such powers may typically belong
156 In re Vaughan Co., 498 B.R. 297, 304 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013).
157 Id. at 305.
158 In reMirant Corp., 675 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 2012).
159 See Boyajian, supra note 9, at 86–87; see also In re Mirant, 675 F.3d at
535–36 (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. H13288 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Jack Brooks)).
160 In re Kaiser, 525 B.R. at 711.
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exclusively to the sovereign, Congress possesses plenary power
to legislate beyond the traditional bounds of the vague legal
doctrine. While the doctrine might create a soft presumption
regarding congressional intent, the clear language of Section
544(b) is sufficient to overcome that presumption. Furthermore,
the argument fails to acknowledge that a creditor who unwinds
a fraudulent transaction in a Bankruptcy proceeding to which
the government is a party increases the pool of assets from
which the government may make its recovery, and therefore is
not enforcing a purely private right, but rather a mixed public-
private right. The impermissible modification argument is
flawed, because it embraces a strained interpretation of the
term “modify,” and places undue weight on a stray remark in the
legislative record. Finally, the policy arguments fail to
acknowledge that (1) given the doctrine ofMoore v. Bay, the state
of the law would be in no way unsettled by the mere fact that
creditors may unwind large fraudulent conveyances because of de
minimis government interests, and (2) the “trustee’s statutory
duties would prevent” him from “overlooking valid objections to
IRS claims,”161 giving debtors a possibility of escaping liability,
and somewhat mitigating the effect of any policy consequences.
Ultimately, the sweeping nature of the plain text of
Section 544(b) creates a clear presumption that the FDCPA
and IRC constitute applicable law under the meaning of the
statute. All arguments to the contrary rest upon convoluted
appeals to legislative intent, undue emphasis on stray remarks
in the legislative record, and unjustified concern with relatively
minor policy consequences. If Congress failed to foresee the full
effects of the law it enacted, it is free to amend the statute as it
desires—but in the interim, it is not the place of the courts to
amend the statute for Congress through reliance on such a
chain of questionable inferences.
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